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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to declare that a will executed by
a woman who thereafter marries is revoked as a matter
of law.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the court which granted a
motion to dismiss contest of will. From orders dismissing
contest of probate of will and admitting the will to probate, plaintiff-appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the orders dismissing the contest and admitting the will to probate and
a determination in his favor, as a matter of law, that
the contest was valid and the will was revoked.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Catharine Armstrong, a widow without issue, executed a will on the 18th day of June, 1965 (J.R. 5). On
the 29th day of January, 1967, she married LeRoy Mayo
(J.R. 11). She died on the 24th day of July, 1967 (J.R.1).
Petition for probate of her will was filed on the 4th
day of August, 1967 (J.R. 1). Contest of probate of will
was filed August 24, 1967 ( J .R. 11). Motion to dismiss
contest was filed August 25, 1967 (J.R. 13). Order granting Motion to Dismiss contest was entered November 22,
1967 (J.R. 24). The will was admitted to probate on
November 21, 1967 (J.R. 20).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMON LAW THAT THE MARRIAGE OF A
WOMAN REVOKED HER PRIOR EXISTING WILL IS STILL
THE LAW OF UTAH.

Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or the constitution
or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of
the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state."
The fact that the will of a woman was revoked upon
her subsequent marriage in common law, is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of this state and remains the law
in Utah even if no statute were extant. There is nothing
in such a rule that is inconsistent with the necessities
of the people.
In Thompson on Wills, 3rd E., p. 272, paragraph
172 it provides:
"172. Effect of subsequent marriage on will
of a woman. . . The common-law rule that the
marriage of a woman absolutely revoked her will
was very generally adopted as the rule in this
country. In many states the incapacity of a married woman to make a will has been removed by
statute, but few of such statutes make provisions
for the effect of the marriage of a woman upon
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her prior will. In most of the states where her
incapacity to make a will has been removed, this
removal of capacity has been determined to be in
effect a removal of all the reasons of the common.
law rule, and therefore to make the rule itselfI
obsolete, and to leave her antenuptial will in full '
force. (citing cases) But a majority of the courts,
in jurisdictions where capacity to make a will
has been removed by statute, still adhere to the
common-law rnle that the will of a) feme sole is
revoked by her subsequent marriage, where the
statute makes no provision for such case. (citing
cases" (Emphasis added.)
The Utah statutes do not mention specifically the
effect of marriage of a woman upon her prior will. The
Utah legislature has enacted into statute the commonlaw on revocation of a man's will. Section 74-1-24. It has
also enacted into statute the common-law on revocation
of a woman's will. See argument under Point III. All
that the emancipation statute did was to remove the
disability of a married woman.
POINT II.
THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW HEIR REVOKES PRO
TANTO A PRIOR EXISTING WILL.

At common-law the marriage of a woman automati·
cally revoked her will. The marriage of a man alone did
not revoke a will, but the birth of a child after making
of a will, did revoke his will. The ratio decidendi behind
the common-law rule was that the appearance of a new
heir effected such a change of circumstances that a preexisting will would be revoked as a matter of law. All
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the common law rules can be viewed from the point:
"the appearance of a new heir not in contemplation on
executing the will." The fact that a marriage was not
sufficient to revoke a man's will was because under
common-law a wife was not considered an heir of the
husband. Under the emancipation statutes, a woman is
given the same rights as a man. Although the commonlaw, as such, may have been repealed in regard to a
woman, the theory or basis of the common-law still ~p
plies, and the appearance of a new heir is sufficient to
revoke the will of either a man or woman. This, as far
as the man is concerned, has been specifically adopted
by statutes in Utah. The difference between the Utah
statutes and the common-law rule on men is that in Utah
we recognize as heirs some who were not such at common-law and revoke the will as to the new heirs. Many
other states have also written into their statutes specifically the approach that the appearance of a new heir
will revoke a will previously made, at least as to the
new heir. In those states without statutes on the point
of revocation, which have considered the matter, the
appearance of a new heir automatically revokes the will.
In re. Teopfer's Estate (N.M.) 78 P. 53. In this case a
woman wrote her will devising all her property to her
sister. Thereafter she married and died leaving surviving her a husband and no children. The will was declared
void. The court stated:
"By our laws ... if a husband or wife die,
leaving no will and no children, the survivor shall
inherit all of the property of the deceased...
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All of the states, so far as we have been able
to discover, which hold that the marriage of a
woman does not set aside a will made before
such marriage, make such holding on the ground
that the law amply provides for the survivor; but
in those jurisdictions where the husband and wife
are heir to each other, in the event of no children
being born, the rule is generally held to be that
marriage works such a change in the condition
and circumstances of the testator as to revoke a
will made prior to such marriage. It is presumed
that the intent of the testator was that such a
will should not take effect upon the happening
of such a contingency. We do not think that the
mere marriage of a woman would set aside her
will, but it is the coming of a new heir; for under
the laws of this territory, by marriage, not only
does a man or woman get a wife or husband, but
also an heir. vVe think that under the laws of
this territory, by which the surviving spouse is
the heir to the other in the event of no children
being born of the marriage and no valid will
being made during coverture, thf' common law is
so altered that on marriage the ante-nuptial will
of a husband would be set aside as well as that
of his wife, and that both of them are now on the
same footing. Marriage and the coming in of an
heir to all the property works such a natural
change in the testator's con<lition that it is not
to be expected that the devise was made in view
of such changed conditions...
'The English law rests on the firm foundation that the birth of an heir who can inherit
lands shall be held operative to destroy a will,
because it is not to be conceived that the testator
has devised his estate in view of such an extraordinary alteration in his condition.' The same

1
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principle and the same rule can be urged with like
force in our own legislation, as stated by the
English cases, and those which have followed the
law which they announce. It is a strained conception to assume that a man who has made a
will while unmarried has made it in contemplation of his assumption of the marriage relation...
It seems to us that in this territory this
reasoning is equally ap_plicable whether the surviving spouse be a man or woman. By the marriage not only a husband or wife, but a new heir
capable of inheriting all of the property, comes
into existence; and in accordance with what we
think is the spirit and reasoning of the doctrine
and the purpose and meaning of our laws, we
hold that the marriage of a testator, whether or
not it be followed by birth of an heir, is operative to revoke any ante-nuptial will."
The Teopfer case was cited with approval in In
re. Lewis' Will, 71 P.2d 1032 (1937), in which the same
court recently stated:

"It is, that by marriage in the territory, the
testator not only acquired a new spouse but a
new heir, which so changed his or her condition
and circumstances that it created a presumption
of the testator's intention that the will should be
revoked upon the happening of such contingency.
That, as under the territorial statutes the law of
property and inheritances made no distinction between the rights of husbands and wives, the reason for the common law distinction had disappeared...
"Under the laws of New Mexico, the husband
and wife, as to property rights and inheritances
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(except as to community property) are placed in
identi:ally th~ same sitHation. Upon marriage
each 1s an heir to the other. The effect of the
rule adopted in the Teo pf er case is that a will
made prior to marriage by either husband or
wife is revoked by marriage because of the advent
of a new heir who is entitled to share in the
property of the other upon his or her decease. It
operates the same whether the testator is a lmsband or wife."
In the case of Dnrfee 1'-'· Risch, 142 Mich. 504, 105
N.W. 1114, the testatrix, being unmarried, made a will,
then married and had ont> child who survived. Women
in Michigan at that time were emancipated and there
was no statute which mentioned the effect upon a woman's will of her subsPquent marriage and bearing of
a child. The court held that the will was rt>voked on
the theory that a new heir had appeared and stated,
after discussing the common-law rule that marriage revoked a will :
"Where, as in this state, the reason for this
rule fails, the rule fails. It does not follow, however, because the marriage alone does not revoke
the will, that marriage and birth of issue do not.
The abrogation of this rule places the male and
the female on the same plane as to this; i.e., that
the subsequent marriage does not of itself revokr
the will. But it is illogical to say, because the
existence of a more restricted rule to the wills
of females prevented the application of the general rule of the common law, that such rule should
not be applied to male and female alike, when the
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removal of the latter's disability makes the general rule applicable ... In Noyes vs. Southworth,
supra, we said: 'Our constitution has done away
with all disabilities of coverture, and expressly
authorized every married woman to make wills
of her estate as if she were sole. This leaves her
case to be governed by the same rule which would
apply to any one else on change of condition.'"
2 Page on Wills, Bowe Parker Revision at page 517
states:
"In many states, statutes are in force which
provide that a married woman has capacity to
make a will and that, under certain specified circumstances, the husband may be the heir of his
wife. The corresponding provision that the wife
may be the heir of the husband has been held, in
many states, to abolish the common law rule that
the marriage of a man does not, of itself, revoke
his will; and such marriage has been held to revoke his will on the theory that, under the statute,
the marriage has at once brought into existence
a new heir, whose existence was not fairly within
the contemplation of testator when he made his
will. If such a statute abolishes the common-law
rule with reference to the marriage of a man, it
would seem that it ought to keep alive the common-law rule that the marriage of a woman revokes her will, even though the legislature has by
another statute given a married woman the capacity to make a will."
The husband is made an heir of his wife in the
state of Utah by virtue of Section 74-4-5, UCA 1953.
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POINT III.
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES CAUSE
THE REVOCATION OF A WILL OF A WOMAN UPON HER
MARRIAGE.

Utah has two constitutional prov1s10ns which are
applicable to the case at bar. Article IV, Section 1 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides:
"The rights of citizens of the State of Utah
to vote and hold office shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges."
Article XXII, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"Real and personal estate of every female,
acquired before marriage, and all property to
which she may afterwards become entitled by
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall
be and remain the estate and property of such
female, and shall not be liable for the debts,
obligations or engagements of her husband, and
may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her
as if she were unmarried."
This last provision of the Constitution has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in In re. Petersen's Estate, Petersen vs. Parry, 97 Utah 325, 93 P.2d
445, in a decision written by Mr. Justice McDonough and
concurred in unanimously by the balance of the court.
This was a case in which a wife made a will leaving her
property to her sister and in substance disinheriting her
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husband. The husband demanded the homestead right
and various items of personal property which would be
exempt from execution. The court held for the husband
in the case and Mr. Justice McDonough, in discussing
the above mentioned constitutional provision, stated:
"This means that she may deal with her property in the respects enumerated, as she might
deal with it at common law were there not disabilities in the wife and estate vested in the husband by reasons of marriage ...
Looking at the provision against its common
law background, there is nothing in its wording
which evidences an intention upon the part of its
authors to go further and inhibit the Legislature
from placing upon the right to devise the limitation here in question. Its evident aim was to
bring about equality not inequality between the
parties to a marriage contract. . .
We adhere to the position that the constitution of this state effects equality between husband and wife insofar as disposing of his or he1·
separate property by will is concerned, and hence
the statute reserving to the survivor of either a
homestead is not in contravention of the constitution." (Emphasis added.)
In the light of this case's interpretation of the constitution, it is necessary that all statutes dealing with
the devise or bequest of property must be interpreted
as applying equally to men and women. This interpretation is reemphasized by the provision of the constitution quoted above of Article IV, Section 1, which states
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that both male and female citizen::; of this state shall
enjoy equally all civil rights and privileges.
2 Page on -Wills, Bowe Parker Revision 515 :
"The rule that marriage revokes the will of
a vrnman has been enacted in many states. If it
is expressly provided by statute that marriage of
a man revokes his will, and if, by the provisions
of another statute or by the general principles
of statutory construction, words of the masculine
gender are to be regarded as including the f eminine gender, the marriage of a woman will also
operate as a revocation of her will."
Section 68-3-12 UCA 1953, the Construction Statute,
says:
"In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(7) -Words used in one gender comprehend
the other."
There are several cases interpreting the effect of
such a statute upon probate statutes. A case applying
the above rule is the Estate of Stark, 52 Ariz. 416, 82
Pac. 2nd 894. The statutes in that case provide that the
will of a man was revoked by subsequent marriage, were
silent as to the revocation of the will of a woman by
her subsequent marriage. By another statute providing
that wherever the statute used the "masculine" gender,
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the "feminine" gender would also apply, added to the
fact that in Arizona a man and woman had been made
equal by the emancipation statute, a woman's will, by
implication, was revoked by her subsequent marriage.
In the case of Parker vs. Swain, Tex. 223 S.W. 231,
Mrs. Swain executed a will. Twelve months thereafter
a new child was born. The question as to the validity of
the will was before the court. The Texas statute provides:
"If a testator having a child or children born
at the time of making his last will and testament,
shall, at his death, leave a child ... born after
the making of such last will and testament, the
child or children so afterborn and pretermitted
shall, unless provided for by settlement, succeed
to the same portion of the father's estate as they
would have been entitled to if the father had died
intestate. . . "

It was claimed, as it is in the case at bar, that because the statute did not mention "testatrix" but specifically refers to wills made by testators and mentioned the
word "father," that such statute had no bearing upon
the mother's will. A married woman was authorized by
the laws of the state of Texas to dispose of her estate
by will. Texas also had the provision of a statute providing:
"The following rule shall govern in the construction of all civil statutory enactments. . .
The masculine gender shall include the feminine
and neuter."
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The court held that the statute applied to the moth.
er's will, and that it was revoked as to the pretermitted
child, and used this language :
" 'We think the true interpretation of our
statute is that in testing and determining whether
the unborn child is mentioned in the will, the
language of the testator, (testatrix in this case)
should be construed and considered with reference to the situation and facts within his knowledge, and having in mind the considerations on
which and with reference to which he was then
acting.' Judge Ramsey seems to assume that the
statute is applicable to wills made by either the
father or mother of afterborn child. The authorities are not in perfect accord upon the question.
A similar statute, under a state of facts such as
we have in this case, was discussed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Ellis vs. Darden, 86
Ga. 368, 12 SE 652, 11 LRA 51. The conclusion
was reached that the word "testator" also included "testatrix." To the same effect is Durfee
vs. Risch, 142 Mich. 504, 105 NW 1114... In the
light of these cases, which are sustained by the
weight of authority, we think the judgment should
be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered affirmed."
In the case of Ellis vs. Darden, Ga. 12 SE 652, the
Georgia court said:
"In construing the Code, it is necessary to
bear in mind section 4 which declares that 'The
masculine gender shall include the feminine.'
Nothing can be more manifest than that this rule
was intended to apply to the provisions of the
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Code on the subject of wills ... From the first to
the last of these sections on wills, with few, if
any exceptions, the masculine includes the feminine. . . It cannot be doubted that in many of
the sections the word 'testator' includes testatrix.
As to most of the sections in which the word occurs, no other construction is possible ... Section
2477 reads: 'In all cases the marriage of the testator or the birth of a child to him, subsequent
to the making of a will in which no provision is
made in contemplation of such an event, shall be
a revocation of the will.' We can have no reasonable doubt that the rule that the masculine includes the feminine applies to this section as well
as to so many others touching the subject of wills,
and consequently that in sense and meaning it
has the same scope as if it read thus: 'In all
cases the marriage of the testator or testatrix or
the birth of a child to him or her, subsequent to
the making of a will in which no provision is made
in contemplation of such an event, shall be a
revocation of the will. . . The act of 1834 put a
man's will, in this respect, upon the footing of
a woman's, with an implied saving in favor of
wills in which provision was made for the prospective wife. It also made the birth of a child
operate as a revocation of any prior will in which
the child was not provided for. Then came the
code, in 1863 and after varying the phraseology
of the act of 1834 so as to make it wider and
more general, incorporated its principle of revocation into the legal system of wills, with an implied saving in favor of wills in which, not the
wife or the child, but the event of marriage or
the birth of a child was provided for ...
We can be sure, at any rate, that the code
nowhere declares that the will of a woman is not
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revoked by marriage or by the birth of a child.
Thus no contradiction is involved in our construction of section 2477 ...
A man may bequeath his entire estate to
strangers. . . All legal rights of the wife and
family, such as dower and a year's support, arP
as secure against a will made at one time as at
another. The object of the provision is to secure
a specific moral influence upon the testamentary
act, the moral influence of having before the mind
a contingent event so momentous as marriage or
the birth of a child, and so deserving of consideration in framing a testamentary scheme. A public policy which rejects the will of a prospective
husband or father because it affords no evidence of the presence of this influence may well
reject that of a prospective wife or mother for
the same reason... There is as much reason in
re4uiring one as the other to furnish evidence
in the \viJl itself that the testamentary act was
performed with the future event of marriage or
birth of a child in actual and present contemplation. Now that women, ... have substantially the
same testamentary freedom as men, the wills of
both sexes made before or after marriage ought
to stand on the same footing . . . the harmony
of the whole testamf'ntary system will be better
preserved by treating the wills of both sexes
alike. When the woman's rights touching the disposition of property are those of a man, her disabilities should also be those of a man ... In order
to save a will from revocation by subsequent marriage, the will itself must contain the requisite
evidence that the event was contemplated. At
least, such evidence must appear on the face of
some document offered for probate as part of
a will."
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In the case of Owens vs. Haines, 199 Penn. 137, 48
Atl. 859, a woman was the owner of real estate and
was married. She executed her will giving her entire
estate to her husband. After <"xecntion of the will, their
only child, Florence, was born and the mother died. The
child claims the property as against the father by the
laws of intestacy as to her. P(:'nnsylvania statutes provide:
"When any person shall make his last will
and testament and afterwards shall marry or have
a child or children not provided for in such will,
and die, leaving a widow and child or either a
widow or child or children although such child or
children be born after the death of their father,
every such person, so far as shall regard the
widow, or child or children after born, shall be
deemed and construed to die intestate; and such
widow, child or children, shall be entitled to such
purports, shares and dividends of the estate ...
of the deceased, as if he had actually died without any will."
The claim was made that since the statute provides
only for the death of a man, under such circumstances,
and said nothing about the woman, that it did not apply
to the will of the woman. The court, however, held that
it did apply to the will of the woman and stated:
"The objection is made by the appellant that
the act applies only to the wills of males, and not
to those of females. This is technical and unreasonable. In the reasonable interpretation of statutes, the words "he," "his," and "him" have repeatedly been held to include women as well as
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men; and the word "any person," in this act, even
if followed by "his," "widow," "father," and "a~
if he had acntally died without any will," must
in the case of a testatrix, be read as if they wer~
followed by "her," "widower," "mother," and "as
if she had actually died without any will."
In the case of Walker vs. Hyland, 56 A. 268 (NJ 1903)
a married woman died. The revocation statutes read
only in the male sex. Held that it applied to females
as well. The court stated that by virtue of the statutes:
" ... a married woman in this state may make
a will devising her real estate in the same manner as she might if she were unmarried... That
any will or testament hereafter made in due form
of law by any married woman above the age of
21 ... shall be held to be as valid and effectual
in law as if she were ... an unmarried woman ...
The 21st section of the act re. Wills of 1846
reads: ' ... That if a testator having a child or
children born at the time of making and publishing such last will and testament, shall at his
death, leave a child or children born after the
making and publishing of said last will or any
descendant of such after born child ... if neither
provided for by settlement nor disinherited by
said testator, shall succeed to the same portion
of the father's estate, as such child . . . would
have been entitled to if the father had died intestate; ... "
Defendant contended that the statute by its terms
is confined to the case of a married man and a father
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and this intentionally so, for at the time it was passed
no married woman could make a will.
"The method for the execution of a will was
provided for by the act of 1851 ... was a supplement to the act of 1846. It was never questioned
between 1852, when the act was passed permitting
a married woman to make a will, and the reenactment of the act of 1851 by the revision of
1874 that the provisions of the act of 1851 applied
to the execution of a will by a married woman.
Yet section 1 of the act of 1851 uses the word
'testator' only. But it is clear that the word 'testator' applies to testatrix irrespective of our act
eoncerning statutes, because 'testatrix' as Webser defines it, means 'a female testator.' We
should have no hesitation in construing testator
to include testatrix if we possessed no act for
the construction of statutes.

• • •

Statutes must be construed reasonably, that
they may be given their self evident legislative
intent. vVhen the Legislature conferred the power
upon a married woman to make a will, and failed
to provide any specific method therefor, that
necessarily carried with it the right to execute
the instrument and devise property thereunder
as other persons might lawfully do. The right
to devise property was also subject to the limitations imposed upon other natural persons in
making such a devise.
Nor do we see any force in the contention
that, because section 21 of the act uses the word
'father' for that reason an after born child of
the 'mother' dying tPstate, would not succeed to
any portion of the mother's estate. Speaking for
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myself alone, if I were compelled to determine
this case upon the words of the 21st section of
the act concerning wills, only, I should feel it
was a matter of construction, not legislation, as
the defendants contend, to hold that since 1852
the word 'father' in this statute, must be givrn
no more force than 'testator' or 'testatrix' and
that it applied to either...
With that section gone, and the power given
to a married woman to make a will, she took that
power subject to all the limitations contained in
the act as to other testators similarly situated,
and with the further limitation contained in the
proviso of section 9 of the married woman's act
as to her husband's estate by the curtesy.
But if the construction just suggested cannot
be sustained, still will we all agree that the word
father, as used in the 21st section of the act concerning wills should be held to apply to mother,
by virtue of the 9th section of an act relative to
statutes ... that whenever, in describing or referring to any person, party, matter or thing, any
word importing the singular number or masculine
gender is used in any statute, the same shall be
understood to include, and shall apply to several
persons and parties, as well as one person or
party, and females as well as males and bodies
corporate as well as individuals and several matters and things as well as one matter or thing,
unless it be otherwise provided, or there be some
thing in the subject or context repugnant to such
construction. . . It declares that the masculine
gender, when used in any statute, shall include
females as well as males. It cannot be said that
father, as used in the 21st section of the act, does
not relate to males; and, if that be conceded, how
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can it be said that 'mother' which relates to females, is not embraced in the statute? ... The
result here reached is consonant with justice. To
have reached any other conclusion would have
compelled us to do violence not only to the law,
but to our natural instinct of humanity."
We are now faced with the statutes of the state
which are applicable to this case. Section 74-1-3 provides:

"A married woman may dispose of all her
estate by will without the consent of her husband,
and may alter or revoke her will in the same
manner as if she were single. Her will must be
executed and proved in the same manner as other
wills."
This statute merely abolishes the common law restriction upon the rights of married women to make a

will, and as such, is in support of our constitutional provisions providing for equality between the sexes.
There are four provisions in the Utah statutes which
deal with revocation of a will by law. The sections are:

74-1-24. Effect of marriage, (JJYl,d issue after
making will. If after making a will the testator
marries and has issue of such marriage born
either in his life time or after his death, and the
wife or issue survives him, the will is conclusively
presumed to be revoked, unless provision is made
for such issue bv some settlement, or unless such
issue is provided for in the will, or in such way
mentioned therein as to show an intention not to
make such provision ; and no evidence of other
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facts to rebut the presumption of such revocation
can be received.
74-1-25. Eff Pct of marriage, if wife survives.
If after making a will the testator marries and thr
wife survives him, the will is conclusively pnsumed to be revoked, unless provision has been
made for ht:~r either by marriage contract, or by
some written settlement showing on its face th1·
testator's intention to substitute such contract or
settlement for a provision in her favor in his will,
or unless she is provided for in the will or in
such provision; and no evidence of other facts
to rebut the presumption of revocation can be
received.
74-1-31. Child born after making will. When
a testator has a child born either in his lifetime or
after his death, or adopted, after the making of
his will, and dies leaving such child unprovided
for by any settlement, and neither provided for
nor in any way mentioned in his will, the child
succeeds to the same portion of the testator's
real and personal property that he would have
succeeded to if the testator had died intestate.
74-1-32. Failure to provide for child or child's
issue. When any testator omits to provide in his
will for any of his children, natural or adopte~,
or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it
appears that such omission was intentional, such
child or the issue of such child has the same share
in the estate of the testator as if he had died
intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in thr
preceding section."
The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that these
four sections apply to a woman as well as to a man,
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in light of the foregoing cases, and particularly so m
light of Section 68-3-12 (7).

If the word "testator" in Section 74-1-24, does not
mean the woman as well as the man who dies, a single
woman could make a will leaving everything to a third
party, thereafter marry, have two children and die without changing her will and her children and husband
would be disinherited. This can only be avoided by
having the word "testator" mean also "testatrix." Webster and Black's Law Dictionary define "testatrix" as
"a female testator," so the word "testator" includes both
male and female.

Under Section 74-1-31, if the word "testator" does
not mean a woman as well as a man, a married woman
can make a will, leave her estate to her surviving child,
thereafter have another child, and if she fails to make
a new will, the new child is disinherited; also, under the
same section a married woman can make a will, die at
childbirth, have the baby delivered after death, and although she might like to change her will, it would be
impossible and the baby would be disinherited.
Under Section 74-1-32 a man may not accidently
disinherit a child. If the word "testator" in this section
does not apply to a woman, as well as a man, a woman
may accidently disinherit a child. The writers can conceive of no reason why a woman should be permitted
accidently to disinherit her child, when a man may not
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vVe now come to Section 74-1-25, which is the spe.
cific section which may control the issue before the
court. This section is written in the masculine only,
but by virtue of Section 68-3-12 (7) should read: "If
after making a will the testatrix marries and the husband survives her, the will is presumed to be revoked,
unless ... "
If the above statutes mean "male" only, they are
unconstitutional. To be constitutional they must be interpreted to mean both sexes. A basic rule of construction is that a statute must be construed, if at all possible,
m a manner that makes the statute constitutional.

rrhe position of plaintiff-appellant is that the Utah
Constitution states that a man and woman are equal in
regard to testamentary dispositions, and its interpretation in In re. Petersen's Estate (supra) makes it mandatory that all of the four Utah statutes in regard to
revocation of wills, by implication, be read in both the
masculine and feminine genders. The Utah Constitution
in the case of In re. Petersen and Section 68-3-12 (7)
merely reaffirmed and put a constitutional basis under
the theories used by the courts heretofore cited, in placing men and women on exactly the same footing, and
in interpreting that any statutes dealing with revoca·
tion of wills applies equally to men and to women and
should be so read.
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CONCLUSION
The united Utah Court held in Mower's Estate, 93
U. 390, 73 P.2d 967, that it was desirable and imperative that the statutes on descents and distribution be
"a unified whole, each provision fitting into the general plan for protection of the family unit, and dependent spouse and minor children, in accordance with the
constitution, legislature, history and policy... " In re.
Petersen (supra) implemented this public policy.
If this court reverses the probate of the instant
11ill, the statutes and constitution of Utah will be made
clear, unified, fair and workable. Now that the matter
has come to this court's attention, any decision to the
contrary will create havoc and inequities. The will must
not be permitted to be probated, and this court should
reverse the lower court.
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